Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law Enforcement’s Legal Capability Under a Difficult Statute by Berry, J. Harrison
Arkansas Law Review
Volume 70 | Number 1 Article 4
January 2017
Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law
Enforcement’s Legal Capability Under a Difficult
Statute
J. Harrison Berry
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the Second Amendment Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arkansas Law Review by an
authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. H. Berry, Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law Enforcement’s Legal Capability Under a Difficult Statute, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 139
(2017).
Available at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol70/iss1/4
Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law 
Enforcement’s Legal Capability Under a 
Difficult Statute∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and 
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right to keep and bear arms.”1  Although the United States 
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller established a 
fundamental understanding that individuals have a right to own 
a gun for personal use, the Court recognized that, as with all 
fundamental rights, the individual right to keep and bear arms is 
“not unlimited.”2  A few limits the Court mentioned included 
“prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial 
sale of arms.”3  Naturally, the Heller decision left us with this 
question:  What are the constitutionally sound restrictions, and 
how far can the government go?4 
The revised Arkansas Carrying a Weapon Statute (Open 
Carry Statute)5 implicates this very question that Heller left 
undecided.  In 2013, the Open Carry Statute was revised by the 
Arkansas legislature, through the passage of Act 746, to read: 
∗ The author sincerely thanks Carlton Bailey, Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas School of Law, for his generous time and helpful comments throughout the 
drafting of this comment. The author also thanks Laurent Sacharoff, Associate Professor of 
Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, for his assistance in the selection and crafting 
of this topic. The author finally thanks his parents and siblings for their unwavering support 
and encouragement in all endeavors. 
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
2. Id. at 595.
3. Id. at 626-27.
4. Adam Liptak, Coming Next, Court Fights on Guns in Cities, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2008, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27guns.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/D3XX-4T2P]. 
5. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120 (2015).
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A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he or 
she possesses a handgun, knife, or club on or about his or 
her person, in a vehicle occupied by him or her, or 
otherwise readily available for use with a purpose to 
attempt to unlawfully employ the handgun, knife, or club as 
a weapon against a person.6 
By reading the plain meaning of the statute, it seems that 
“[i]t is now illegal to possess a handgun only if the person has 
the ‘purpose’ to use it ‘unlawfully’ against a person.”7  Although 
the history of this Arkansas criminal statute tends to show that 
the legalization of openly carrying firearms may not have been 
the true intention of the legislature,8 it is anticipated that the 
court will be bound by the rule of lenity.9 
The rule of lenity is a legal doctrine that requires penal 
statutes to “be construed to reach the most lenient interpretation 
from the defendant’s standpoint.”10  In cases involving an 
ambiguous statute, such as the Arkansas Open Carry Statute, the 
court will be bound to “strictly” construe the penal statute and 
resolve all doubts in favor of the defendant.11  Because the rule 
of lenity will likely apply, the practical consequence is that 
Arkansas’s Open Carry Statute likely legalizes the possession of 
a firearm in public view so long as the possessor does not have 
an intention to use the gun unlawfully against another.12  The 
most recent non-binding Attorney General opinion on this issue 
took this same interpretation and many law enforcement 
departments across the state are handling the situation 
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(a) (2015).
7. Laurent Sacharoff & Jacob Worlow, Open Carry in Arkansas—An Ambiguous
Statute, 2014 ARK. L. NOTES 1548 (2014), 
http://media.law.uark.edu/arklawnotes/2014/02/13/open-carry-in-arkansas-an-ambiguous-
statute/ [https://perma.cc/3GBP-CMZF]. 
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Michael W. Mullane, Statutory Interpretation in Arkansas: How Arkansas
Courts Interpret Statutes. A Rational Approach, 2005 ARK. L. NOTES 405 (2005), 
http://media.law.uark.edu/arklawnotes/files/2011/03/Mullane-Statutory-Interpretation-in-
Arkansas-Arkansas-Law-Notes-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/V453-5S4K].  
11. Williams v. State, 364 Ark. 203, 208, 217 S.W.3d 817, 819 (2005).
12. Sacharoff & Worlow, supra note 7.
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accordingly.13  However, the complete lack of any judicial or 
legislative guidance on what exactly the revisions in the statute 
mean has led to much debate, even resulting in contradicting 
attorneys general opinions.14 
Although the statute has clearly sparked confusion 
throughout the state on exactly how people may carry their guns 
in public,15 the variety of issues raised by this statute do not stop 
at simple statutory interpretation.  The real concerns that stem 
from this statute deeply coincide with law enforcement’s legal 
capability regarding this law, and most importantly, how this 
capability impacts Arkansas citizens who choose to openly carry 
their firearms. 
Because a plain meaning interpretation and the rule of 
lenity likely permit the open carry of firearms under the 
Arkansas Open Carry Statute, the Arkansas General Assembly 
must provide clarification in order to ensure proper protection 
under the Fourth Amendment.  This comment will focus on the 
issues relating to this ambiguous statute, and it will provide 
some clarity on law enforcement’s legal capability when dealing 
with the Arkansas Carrying a Weapon Statute.  Furthermore, the 
problems and concerns with leaving this statute in the present 
legal climate, especially given the broad legal discretion of law 
enforcement, will be addressed.  Finally, this article provides 
some suggestions for the Arkansas General Assembly to revise 
the statute and, therefore, diminish the concerns exemplified by 
the current open carry legislation. 
13. See Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015); see also Telephone
Interview with Scott Young, Lieutenant, Wash. Cty. Sheriff’s Office (Oct. 20, 2015); 
Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Si, Benton Cty. Sheriff’s Office (Oct. 20, 2015); 
Telephone Interview with Greg Downs, Gen. Counsel, Ark. State Police  (Oct. 20, 2015); 
Sacharoff & Worlow, supra note 7. 
14. Compare Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015) (addressing the
effects of Act 746 and advising that a person may carry a handgun legally so long as they 
do not have the intent to attempt unlawful employment of the handgun), with Ark. Op. 
Att’y Gen. No. 2013-47 (July 8, 2013) (advising that Act 746 should not be interpreted to 
authorize “open-carry”).  
15. See Melanie Buck, Open Carry Debate Continues, MYPULSENEWS.COM (July 1,
2015), http://mypulsenews.com/open-carry-debate-continues/ [https://perma.cc/96YM-
BKRC]. 
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II. REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of all citizens to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government.16  The touchstone of analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always “the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a 
citizen’s personal security.”17  Reasonableness depends “on a 
balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to 
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers.”18  The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of a 
person, including seizures that are substantially shorter when 
compared to traditional arrests.19  “While the Court has 
recognized that in some circumstances a person may be detained 
briefly, without probable cause to arrest him,” the Fourth 
Amendment requires officers to have “at least [] a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in 
criminal activity” before they may constitutionally engage in 
“any curtailment of a person’s liberty.”20  The totality of the 
circumstances—“the whole picture”—must be taken into 
account in determining if an officer has developed this founded 
suspicion.21 
III. THE PROBLEMATIC INTERACTION
SCENARIOS BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
INDIVIDUALS 
To effectively understand law enforcement’s legal 
capability under the statute and, in turn, the concerns of this 
article, it is important to address the types of police-citizen 
encounters this statute implicates.  The established law 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
18. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
19. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 19.
20. Reid, 448 U.S. at 440; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979);
Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 878. 
21. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); see also Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 884. 
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governing these interactions gives a thorough basis for realizing 
the concerns this statute creates. 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that in situations 
where it is impractical for an officer to obtain advance judicial 
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant process, 
the officer’s intrusion “must be tested by the Fourth 
Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”22  Arkansas has adopted the Supreme 
Court’s construction of the types of searches and seizures that 
result from these “street” police-citizen interactions,23 which 
generally fall into these categories:  (1) the officer develops a 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited search for weapons 
that might be used to assault him, the Terry stop and frisk 
scenario;24 (2) a consensual officer-citizen encounter;25 (3) the 
officer develops probable cause that a crime has been 
committed, the search incident to arrest scenario;26 (4) a routine 
traffic stop;27 (5) police engaging in community caretaking 
functions;28 and (6) the officer has a reasonable belief there may 
be weapons in a car with a dangerous suspect.29  Although it is 
possible that all of these scenarios could implicate the Arkansas 
Open Carry Statute, the two types of encounters that create the 
true concerns of this article include Terry stop and frisks and 
consensual encounters because of law enforcement’s capability 
to search individuals based solely on the low threshold standard 
of reasonable suspicion. 
22. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
23. Jefferson v. State, 349 Ark. 236, 244, 76 S.W.3d 850, 854-55 (2002); Thompson
v. State, 303 Ark. 407, 409-10, 797 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (1990).
24. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
25. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
26. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-98 (1914); see also United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
27. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 333-34 (1977).
28. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lister, 540 U.S. 419, 424-25 (2004) (holding that police
handing out flyers was not to determine whether individuals were committing a crime, but 
rather to ask vehicle occupants for their help in providing information about a crime that 
was likely committed by others, and therefore is held to different, less demanding, 
constitutional standards).  
29. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035, 1054 (1983).
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The third interaction scenario, the search incident to arrest 
scenario, requires a substantially higher evidentiary standard 
than Terry stops or consensual encounters:  that of probable 
cause.30  Through a line of cases, the Supreme Court has 
determined when and how the search incident to arrest exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies.31  
When officers establish probable cause that a crime has been 
committed, they are permitted to conduct a search of the person 
and their vehicle “when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search” or if there is a likelihood of discovering offense 
related evidence in the vehicle,32 without a warrant.33  Some 
jurisdictions, such as Arkansas, allow this search incident to 
arrest exception to extend outside of the vehicle context to the 
immediate surroundings of the accused.34  This higher standard 
of probable cause as well as the specifically delineated 
circumstances for searches incident to arrest sufficiently protect 
individuals from arbitrary or minimally justified searches that 
the current Open Carry Statute seems to encourage. 
In addition, routine traffic stops and car searches will 
implicate the Open Carry Statute when officers lawfully pull a 
vehicle over and the individual is openly carrying a firearm.  
However, in these instances, the officer’s interactions are 
controlled by the same foundational principles commanded by 
Terry.35 
30. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
31. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341, 351 (2009); Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 623-24 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); Robinson, 
414 U.S. at 224; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).  Arkansas has adopted 
a similar construction of the United States Supreme Court search incident to arrest 
exception through ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.4. 
32. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343-44.
33. Angad Singh, Stepping Out of the Vehicle: The Potential of Arizona v. Gant to
End Automatic Searches Incident to Arrest Beyond the Vehicular Context, 59 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1759, 1770, 1775, 1780 (2010); see also Gant, 556 U.S. at 351; Belton, 453 U.S. at 
462-63; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 218; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
34. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.5; see also Sean Foley, The Newly Murky World of
Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest: Why the Gant Restrictions Should Apply to All 
Searches Incident to Arrest, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 753, 767-80 (2013). 
35. The Supreme Court has held that when an officer legally stops a driver they may
order the driver out of the car without further justification.  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
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The “special needs” or “community caretaking” exceptions 
are specifically delineated police activities that the Supreme 
Court has come to recognize as distinctive from ordinary law 
enforcement activities.36  These searches and seizures come 
within the “special needs” category when a perceived need 
makes the warrant requirement or development of probable 
cause impractical.37  Although these are functions and activities 
of law enforcement that could potentially implicate the Open 
Carry Statute, this area of law is still developing and more 
closely resembles other government activities that invade the 
privacy interests of citizens, such as administrative and border 
searches, rather than ordinary criminal law enforcement.38  As 
such, these non-criminal law enforcement interactions are not 
directly applicable to the main concerns of this article and will 
not be specifically addressed. 
U.S. 106, 111 (1977).  Furthermore, the officer may legally order the passenger out of the 
car.  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997).  In these circumstances, the officer 
is still bound by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and any decision by the 
officer relating to a search of the individual will demand a Terry analysis.  See Thomas K. 
Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat-Downs, or Frisks?: The Scope of the Permissible 
Intrusion to Ascertain if a Detained Person Is Armed, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 491, 491-92 
(1999). 
36. See Mary Elizabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another
Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 326-27 (1999); see also William J. 
Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 553, 553-56 (1992).  
37. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATING CRIME 469-73 (6th ed. 2017).  For a discussion on the limitations and legal 
requirements for officers undertaking community caretaking functions, see Michael R. 
Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1518, 1528-30 (2009).   
38. For examples of distinct police activities that are distinguished from ordinary law
enforcement activities, see Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 401-02 (2006) 
(police rendering emergency aid); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004) (police 
handing out flyers); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 444 (1990) (highway 
sobriety checkpoints); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 327, 347-48 (1985) (searches 
by public school officials); United States v. Ramsay, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 623-25 (1977) 
(border searches); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 365 (1976) (inventory 
searches); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967) (administrative searches). 
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A. Terry Stop and Frisk
Of the two types of encounters that create the immediate 
concerns surrounding this statute, the Terry stop and frisk 
encounter is an appropriate starting point for determining how 
law enforcement officers will handle police-citizen interactions 
involving the open carrying of firearms in Arkansas.  The 
established principles of the Terry stop and frisk scenario 
provide law enforcement officers with great discretion to stop 
and frisk citizens even when there is no real reason to suspect 
any involvement in a crime,39 and it is this discretion that 
potentially implicates Fourth Amendment concerns stemming 
from the Open Carry Statute.  Indeed, a great deal of confusion 
related to this statute revolves around these very encounters.40 
In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, the High Court held 
that when a police officer observes unusual conduct that leads 
them reasonably to conclude that an individual may be armed 
and presently dangerous, they are entitled to conduct a frisk 
search of that individual for weapons.41  This holding defined 
when, and more importantly why, officers can conduct a pat-
down search of individuals whom they encounter on a daily 
basis on the streets.42  The Court’s reasoning was based on 
officer safety.43  However, in practice, it has established itself as 
an effective tool for law enforcement in their investigations.44  
39. See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study
of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 884-86 (2002); see 
also David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court 
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 
977, 986, 1021 (1998) [hereinafter Harris, Particularized Suspicion]; David A. Harris, 
Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5, (1994) 
[hereinafter Harris, Frisking Every Suspect]. 
40. See Laurent A. Sacharoff, Editorial, Complex Question: Gun Law’s Meaning
Complicated, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 2015, at 33; see also Laura 
Monteverdi, Clarifying the Open Carry Law in Arkansas, KTHV 
 (June 5, 2015, 11:25 AM), 
http://legacy.thv11.com/story/news/local/2015/06/04/clarifying-the-open-carry-law-in-
arkansas/28504357/ [https://perma.cc/92GE-QYBY]. 
41. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Daniel C. Isaacs, Miranda’s Application to the Expanding Terry Stop, 18
J.L. & POL’Y 383, 387-93 (2009).
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Of course, these Terry frisks always implicate the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures because even though brief, they are still considered 
a constitutional “search” and “seizure.”45  The Terry decision 
determined that when officers develop a reasonable suspicion 
that the individual is armed and presently dangerous, then a 
“carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons” 
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.46 
The permissible degree of intrusion allowed during a Terry 
stop has greatly expanded since the Supreme Court decision in 
1968.47  Courts have consistently departed from the “carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing,”48 as the trend towards 
granting officers “greater latitude in using force in order to 
‘neutralize’ potentially dangerous suspects during an 
investigation detention” has become the norm.49  In effect, since 
Terry, the Supreme Court has expanded the permissible reasons 
for the stop as well as the scope of the intrusion for police 
officers.50 
In this state, reasonable suspicion is specifically defined in 
the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
[A] suspicion based on facts or circumstances which of
themselves do not give rise to the probable cause requisite
to justify a lawful arrest, but which give rise to more than a
bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is reasonable as
opposed to an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion.51
The Arkansas legislature has defined the factors to be 
considered in determining if a police officer has grounds to 
45. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
46. Id.
47. See Isaacs, supra note 44, at 387; see also United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d
1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990). 
48. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
49. See Isaacs, supra note 44, at 393.
50. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-500 (1983); see also Isaacs, supra note
44, at 387-93. 
51. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 2.1.
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reasonably suspect an individual.52  There are many factors that 
are considered: 
(1) The demeanor of the suspect;
(2) The gait and manner of the suspect;
(3) Any knowledge the officer may have of the suspect’s
background or character;
(4) Whether the suspect is carrying anything, and what he
or she is carrying;
(5) The manner in which the suspect is dressed, including
bulges in clothing, when considered in light of all of the
other factors;
(6) The time of the day or night the suspect is observed;
(7) Any overheard conversation of the suspect;
(8) The particular streets and areas involved;
(9) Any information received from third persons, whether
they are known or unknown;
(10) Whether the suspect is consorting with others whose
conduct is reasonably suspect;
(11) The suspect’s proximity to known criminal conduct;
(12) The incidence of crime in the immediate
neighborhood;
(13) The suspect’s apparent effort to conceal an article; and
(14) The apparent effort of the suspect to avoid
identification or confrontation by a law enforcement
officer.53
In viewing this list, it becomes quickly apparent that almost 
everything is taken into account when determining reasonable 
suspicion.  The Arkansas Supreme Court has further clarified 
that this list is not exhaustive.54  An officer can rely on things 
that seem completely innocent in nature.  For example, the 
officer can rely on the gait and manner of the person, the 
particular streets and areas involved, or—of particular 
importance to the Arkansas Open Carry Statute—whether the 
suspect is carrying anything.55  This establishes the initial 
concern with the revised statute.  Does the simple fact that the 
52. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203 (West 2016).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203.
54. Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 473 (Ark. 2001).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203.
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suspect is openly carrying a firearm establish a reasonable 
suspicion that he is engaged in criminal activity? 
Of course, the answer depends on whether the statute 
effectively legalizes open carry in public.  If these recent textual 
changes do not allow for open carry—as Dustin McDaniel, the 
previous Attorney General, interpreted the statute—then the 
answer is clearly yes because openly carrying individuals would 
simply be in violation of the statute itself.  Officers who view 
individuals openly carrying firearms would have probable cause, 
a substantially higher standard than reasonable suspicion, that 
such person was in violation of the Carrying a Weapon statute. 
However, if Arkansas is now an open carry state (which 
appears to be the case with the current statute)56 then this fact 
alone should not be sufficient to establish a reasonable 
suspicion.  In states where possession of an unconcealed firearm 
is legal, the mere observation or report of an unconcealed 
firearm cannot, without more, create reasonable suspicion for a 
Terry stop.57  However, because the recent textual changes of 
this statute are ambiguous, there is concern throughout the state 
of what standard of suspicion officers develop, or must develop, 
when dealing with openly carrying citizens. 
Furthermore, if officers do develop a reasonable suspicion 
that the individual is in violation of the Carrying a Weapon 
statute, is this enough to seize and search the individual? 
Arkansas has developed its own rule for when a detention 
without an arrest may transpire.  This rule states: 
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place 
may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any 
person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a 
56. See infra Part III.A-B.
57. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131-33 (6th Cir.
2015); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Lewis, 
672 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217-18 (3d. Cir. 
2000); St. John v. McColley, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161-63 (D.N.M. 2009); United States 
v. Dudley, 854 F. Supp. 570, 579-80 (S.D. Ind. 1994); Pulley v. Commonwealth, 481
S.W.3d 520, 526-27 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 480-81
(Tenn. 2012).  But see infra Part IV.B (arguing in actual practice it may be enough to
search the individual).
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misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons 
or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such action 
is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the 
identification of the person or to determine the lawfulness 
of his conduct.  An officer acting under this rule may 
require the person to remain in or near such place in the 
officer’s presence for a period of not more than fifteen (15) 
minutes or for such time as is reasonable under the 
circumstances.  At the end of such period the person 
detained shall be released without further restraint, or 
arrested and charged with an offense.58 
This rule precisely clarifies that the officer’s reasonable 
suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity 
“must be tied to commission of a felony or a misdemeanor 
involving forcible injury to persons or property.”59  Violation of 
the Open Carry Statute is a Class-A misdemeanor.60  For an 
officer to stop and detain any person they suspect of committing 
a misdemeanor, the crime itself must involve “danger of forcible 
injury to persons.”61  Of course, the Open Carry Statute 
addresses the danger of forcible injury to persons, namely by 
including the mens rea or mental state requirement of the action 
being done “with a purpose to attempt to unlawfully employ the 
handgun . . .  as a weapon against a person.”62  Therefore, when 
a police officer investigates an individual openly carrying a 
firearm and develops a reasonable suspicion that the individual 
is violating the Open Carry Statute—by determining that they 
have an intent to employ the weapon unlawfully—it would be 
reasonable to stop and detain the individual.  This strict 
connection requiring the officer’s development of reasonable 
suspicion to the commission of this particular crime essentially 
mandates that the officer’s investigation revolve around the 
intent of the individual.  Proving intent is, of course, “inherently 
58. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1.
59. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1; see also Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 154-55, 60 S.W.3d.
464, 473 (2001). 
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(d) (West 2013).
61. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1.
62. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(a) (West 2015).
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difficult” and generally requires circumstantial evidence to 
prove.63 
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.4 provides that if 
the officer has detained an individual under Rule 3.1, they may 
search “the immediate surroundings for, and seize, any weapon 
or other dangerous thing which may be used against the officer 
or others.”64  When dealing with the Open Carry Statute, this 
allows the officer to seize the firearm and search the immediate 
surroundings at the moment they develop reasonable suspicion 
that the statute has been violated.  Naturally, without definitively 
knowing whether openly carrying itself develops this reasonable 
suspicion, officers and citizens alike are unsure how this applies 
to the current form of the statute.  Again, the ambiguity makes it 
difficult to determine how these legal standards should 
theoretically play out in these police-citizen interactions. 
Many of the interactions that law enforcement officers will 
have with openly carrying individuals will be sparked by 
anonymous tips from citizens within the community.65  The 
natural question of consequence is how do these anonymous tips 
fit into the “totality of the circumstances” when developing a 
reasonable suspicion to briefly detain and search such 
individuals?  The Supreme Court has established that the 
reliability of the anonymous tipster is the focal point of this 
inquiry. 
In Florida v. JL, the Supreme Court decided “whether an 
anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, 
sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that 
person.”66  In JL, “an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-
63. See Chad S.C. Stover, Best Practices in Proving Specific Intent and Malice.
What Can Civil and Criminal Litigators Learn from One Another?, ABA SEC. LITIG., at 1, 
5 (2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2014_sac/
2014_sac/best_practices.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8ND-784G].  
64. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.4.
65. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Volokh Conspiracy: The Fourth Amendment and
Open Carry (Where Such Open Carry Is Legal), WASH. POST (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/13/the-fourth-
amendment-and-open-carry-of-guns-where-such-open-carry-is-legal/ 
[https://perma.cc/H8AQ-KB4K]. 
66. 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
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Dade Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus 
stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”67  The 
officers arrived at the scene and, apart from the tip, had no 
reason to suspect any of the three waiting at the bus stop of 
being involved in illegal conduct.68  The officers frisked J. L. 
and seized an illegal gun from his pocket.69  The Supreme Court 
held that “[u]nlike a tip from a known informant whose 
reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if 
her allegations turn out to be fabricated . . . ‘an anonymous tip 
alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge 
or veracity.’”70  In JL, the Supreme Court made it clear that an 
anonymous tip claiming a person is carrying a gun is not, 
without more, sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and 
frisk of that person,71 but the Court, in dicta, did mention the 
dangerous nature of firearms.72 
However, that is not to say that any tip that is given to law 
enforcement about an individual openly carrying a firearm will 
be dismissed as insufficient to justify a stop.  The reality is quite 
the opposite as illustrated in Parker v. Chard.73 
In Chard, Officers Chard and Illetschko “were dispatched 
to investigate shoplifting allegations in Uptown Minneapolis.”74  
“The manager said that a customer had approached another [] 
employee and pointed out several African American females 
inside the store . . .  claim[ing] to have seen them running out of 
Victoria’s Secret.”75  “An employee there confirmed that a 
‘group of black females’ had ‘very recently’ run out of the store, 
but could not confirm whether any merchandise was stolen.”76  
The officers did not believe Parker and her friends had stolen 
any merchandise, noting the women never acted suspiciously; 
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 270.
71. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
72. Id. at 272.
73. See 777 F.3d. 977, 981-82 (8th Cir. 2015).
74. Id. at 979.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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the officers searched Parker’s bags and, unsurprisingly, found 
nothing stolen.77  Parker filed a civil rights lawsuit against the 
officer for seizing her without reasonable suspicion.78  The 
Eighth Circuit held that since “the tipster’s basis of knowledge 
was not inside information but rather the observation of visible 
activity . . . it was not clearly established that [Officers] Chard 
and Illetschko—having corroborated the running asserted in the 
eyewitness tip, and knowing shoplifting recently occurred—
could not reasonably suspect Parker of shoplifting.”79  Here, the 
reliability of the tip was confirmed by the observation of the 
visible activity by the witness as well as corroboration of the 
part of the tip alleging suspicious activity.80 
To put these principles into the context of the current Open 
Carry Statute, an anonymous tip alleging only that an individual 
is openly carrying a firearm in public is insufficient in and of 
itself to develop reasonable suspicion because there are no 
specific facts of criminality.81  Of course, nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits officers from “responding to the call and 
ascertaining through a consensual encounter whether [the 
suspect] appear[s] dangerous.”82  But, until particularized facts 
supporting a reasonable suspicion emerge, a stop of these 
individuals is not allowed based solely on an anonymous tip that 
they are carrying a firearm openly.83 
The totality of the circumstances test allows for an officer 
to draw on their own experiences and even legal activity can be 
significant contributions in developing a reasonable suspicion.84  
Looking to the Arkansas law, the legislatively-defined factors 
are a good starting point for determining what circumstances 
will play a role in deciding whether the officer has a reasonable 
77. Id.
78. Chard, 777 F.3d at 980.
79. Id. at 981.
80. Id.
81. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131-34 (6th Cir.
2015); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217-19 (3d Cir. 2000). 
82. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1133; see also infra Part III.B.
83. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1133.
84. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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suspicion.85  The fact that an individual is openly carrying a 
firearm is very significant but, alone, cannot be dispositive in an 
open carry state.  However, the ambiguity within the statute and 
lack of guidance of its current meaning have made these 
questions significantly more complex than the average open 
carry state. 
The unique concern when dealing with the Open Carry 
Statute evolves when officers use an individual’s obvious 
possession of a firearm to search and seize individuals who 
normally—if not carrying a visible firearm or weapon—would 
not be subject to such Fourth Amendment intrusions.86  Take as 
an example the recent case against Richard Chambless. 
In May 2015, Richard Chambless was in Bald Knob, 
Arkansas shopping between different stores while openly 
carrying a pistol on his hip.87  As he stopped inside the local 
McDonald’s to get a drink, Bald Knob Police arrived at the 
scene and immediately arrested him for disorderly conduct and 
carrying a weapon in violation of Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-73-120, 
even though he was not acting unusual or violent.88  As he said, 
“I was out shopping in town, stopped here to get a drink of water 
carrying my weapon and went to jail for it.”89  Despite 
arguments that he had been seized illegally, he was convicted of 
both crimes and sentenced to “1 year probation, 15 days in jail, 
and a $2,160 fine.”90  However, before he was able to appeal his 
convictions, Attorney General Leslie Rutledge issued her 
official opinion on the matter stating that open carry is legal in 
85. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203 (Repl. 2016).
86. See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1097-99 (1998). 
87. Janelle Lilley & Marine Glisovic, UPDATE: Man Found Guilty After Being
Arrested for Open Carry in Bald Knob, KATV (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://katv.com/news/local/man-arrested-for-open-carry-in-bald-knob 
[https://perma.cc/KPT7-PMUF]. 
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; Curt Lanning, Bald Knob Open Carry Case Dismissed,
ARKANSASMATTERS.COM (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.arkansasmatters.com/news/local-
news/bald-knob-open-carry-case-dismissed/273686971 [https://perma.cc/9AL9-TALJ]. 
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Arkansas, and the case against Chambless was subsequently 
dropped.91 
Another similar example is James Tanner who recently 
filed a civil lawsuit against the Arkansas State Police after his 
concealed carry license was revoked.92  On November 29, 2014, 
James Tanner, who at the time was a concealed carry license 
holder, was openly carrying a handgun “while shopping at a 
Wal-Mart in Searcy, Arkansas.”93  Arkansas State Trooper Kurt 
Ziegenhorn, an out-of-uniform officer who noticed Tanner’s 
open firearm, immediately approached Tanner “and demanded 
that [he] provide identification.”94  Tanner refused to provide 
any identification “and proceeded to leave.”95  Tanner was 
arrested shortly thereafter and, interestingly, charged with 
obstruction of governmental operations, but not with violating 
the Carrying a Weapon Statute.96  Tanner was convicted and his 
administrative appeal of the revocation of his concealed carry 
license was unsuccessful.97  Arguments that his Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated by the illegal seizure were 
immediately cast aside by the Pulaski County Circuit Court 
Judge as “senseless.”98 
Both of these cases illustrate how officers across the state 
have handled encounters with openly carrying individuals.  In 
both instances, the officers seized and searched the individuals 
without a warrant.  Although it is unclear for certain exactly 
what facts the officers relied upon in developing reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to conduct these searches and 
seizures, what is readily apparent is that the visible firearm was 
91. Lanning, supra note 90.
92. Lawsuit Viewed As Test of Arkansas’ Open-Carry Firearm Law, WASH. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2016) [hereinafter, Lawsuit Viewed As Test], 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/24/lawsuit-viewed-as-test-of-arkansas-
open-carry-fire/ [https://perma.cc/RP93-6DNZ]. 
93. Order Affirming Decision of Ark. State Police at 2, Tanner v. Ark. State Police,
No. 60CV-15-3197 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 26, 2016). 
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Lawsuit Viewed As Test, supra note 92.
97. Id.; Order Affirming Decision of Ark. State Police, supra note 93, at 1.
98. Order Affirming Decision of Ark. State Police, supra note 93, at 1, 6-7.
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a substantial factor—if not the only factor—in their decision to 
investigate, detain, and ultimately arrest them. 
This is a major concern advanced by the current Open 
Carry Statute.  The discretion of police officers to use seemingly 
innocent facts to validate seizures and subsequent searches of an 
individual is certainly not a new concept;99 however, the 
distinguishing concern with this statute is that officers can use 
the individual’s visible firearm as a substantial factor in support 
of reasonable suspicion, a standard that has been diluted in favor 
of neutralizing potentially dangerous suspects.100  These same 
individuals, without carrying a firearm, would definitely not 
have been subjected to such searches and seizures—or even 
investigation at all—which is the problem perpetuated by the 
lack of clarification and guidance from the legislature and the 
Arkansas Judiciary, as well as, to some extent, the textual nature 
of the statute itself.   Furthermore, because police officers must 
determine the mental state or “purpose” for which these 
individuals are openly carrying their firearms, there is an 
incentive for police officers to combine seemingly innocent facts 
(e.g., late at night, high crime area, suspect’s demeanor, etc.) to 
support any conclusions they may have drawn about the 
individual.  The potential for abuse is obvious, especially given 
recent evidence illuminating the existence of racial profiling, 
stopping, and frisking without cause by law enforcement 
officials.101  Given the historical dilution and expansion of the 
99. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 502 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 
(1968). 
100. See Isaacs, supra note 44, at 387-93.
101. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 303 (2001) 
(“The powerful combination of governmental investigations, judicial findings, anecdotal 
evidence, and statements by law enforcement officials leave little doubt about the existence 
of racial profiling and other stops without cause.”); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the 
Usual Suspects: Race and The Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 956-65 (1999) 
(arguing that Terry established a pattern of racially motivated searches, and offering a 
variety of remedies to deter racially motivated searches and seizures); Angela J. Davis, 
Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 425-27 (1997) (discussing the 
discretionary nature of pre-textual stops and their discriminatory effect on African-
Americans and Latinos); MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ERICA L. SMITH & PATRICK A. LANGAN, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND 
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original limited holding of Terry,102 coupled with the seemingly 
unlimited number of innocent facts that can establish reasonable 
suspicion, individuals who openly carry a firearm in Arkansas 
are essentially providing police with substantial support—if not 
complete justification—for seizing and searching their person. 
B. Consensual Encounter
The second type of police-citizen interaction is the 
consensual encounter.  Under the Consensual Encounter 
Doctrine, the Supreme Court has upheld substantial investigative 
questioning by armed police officers without any objective 
indication of criminality, so long as a reasonable person would 
feel free to leave.103 
The seminal case outlining this concept is United States v. 
Mendenhall.104  In Mendenhall, the defendant, Sylvia 
Mendenhall, arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on a 
commercial airline flight from Los Angeles.105  As she 
disembarked, she was observed by two DEA agents.106  After 
observing the defendant’s conduct, which appeared to be 
characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics, the 
agents approached her in the concourse, identified themselves as 
federal agents, and asked to see her identification and airline 
ticket.107  The agents noticed that the name on the defendant’s 
ticket was different from the name on her identification.108  
When the agents questioned Mendenhall, she “became quite 
shaken, extremely nervous . . . [and] [s]he had a hard time 
speaking.”109 
THE PUBLIC, 2005 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X8E5-ZRXH]. 
102. See Isaacs, supra note 44, at 387.
103. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980); Daniel J. Steinbock,
The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility 
of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 
509-10 (2001); see also Volokh, supra note 65.
104. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 546-47.
105. Id. at 547.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 547-48.
108. Id. at 548.
109. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548.
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After she was subsequently arrested, the defendant argued 
on appeal of her conviction that the agents’ conduct was not a 
permissive stop under the standards of Terry.110  The Court 
concluded “that a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave;” and 
therefore, since no seizure of the defendant actually took place, 
the agents’ conduct did not amount to an intrusion upon any 
constitutionally protected interest.111  Some factors to be 
considered in determining if a reasonable person would have felt 
free to leave include the number of officers present, the display 
of a weapon, physical contact between the officer and citizen, 
and the officer’s language and tone of voice.112 
California v. Hodari D. expanded this construct by adding 
a new element to the Mendenhall test.113  In Hodari D., the 
Court held that a seizure does not occur until either the 
individual actually submits to the show of authority of the 
officer, or the officer applies physical force.114 
Information developed during these consensual 
encounters—or even the attempt to avoid or resist them—can 
give rise to reasonable suspicion for a stop.115  Many times, 
because the officer has untethered discretion to ask any 
questions she or he deems appropriate, including requesting 
consent to search the individual, “it is not uncommon for a 
consensual encounter to lead directly to probable cause to 
arrest.”116 
The typical concern of both individuals and law 
enforcement agencies alike, when dealing with the Open Carry 
Statute, revolves around the officer’s authority when in the 
110. Id. at 549-50.
111. Id. at 554-55.
112. Id. at 554.
113. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-29 (1991).
114. Id. at 629 (considering a chase by a clearly identifiable police officer).
115. Steinbock, supra note 103, at 520; see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-49,
559-60.
116. Steinbock, supra note 103, at 520.
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presence of an individual openly carrying a firearm in public.117  
Because the Fourth Amendment is not even implicated in 
consensual encounters, law enforcement officers essentially 
have unlimited discretion to investigate these individuals so long 
as no constitutional search or seizure occurs. 
The troubling issue arises again in that, just as illuminated 
by the low standard of investigative Terry stops, consensual 
encounters require no justification by the officer at all; the only 
way any Fourth Amendment protections arise is if a reasonable 
person would feel free to disregard the officer’s demand,118 or if 
they actually submit to the officer’s show of authority.119  Else, 
the Fourth Amendment has no application.  This unhindered 
discretion is fundamentally eroding the Fourth Amendment 
rights of openly carrying, law-abiding citizens.  Citizens who 
openly carry a firearm in Arkansas can, and will, be investigated 
by law enforcement officers even though they are technically 
not violating any law.120  Just as in Tanner and Chambless’ 
cases, the simple fact that they were openly carrying a firearm 
was the reason that officers initiated their investigation (and 
likely their arrest).121 
In essence, by not violating the law, individuals openly 
carrying are effectively encouraging, if not requiring, law 
enforcement officers to inquire and explore their person through 
consensual encounters, which are by their very nature used as a 
tool for police to initiate investigations of crime and ultimately 
lead to arrests.122  And, of course, once these encounters ensue, 
the low standard of reasonable suspicion—distilled by the fact 
that the individual possesses a firearm—is all the officer needs 
117. See Sheriff’s Office Opposes Open Carry of Handguns, PINE BLUFF COMM.,
(Oct. 13, 2015, 4:05 AM), http://pbcommercial.com/news/local/sheriff-s-office-opposes-
open-carry-handguns [https://perma.cc/RP7L-VRC9]. 
118. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
119. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
555; Steinbock, supra note 103, at 515-16. 
120. See Suit Viewed As Test of State’s Open-Carry Law, TEXARKANA GAZETTE
(Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.texarkanagazette.com/news/arkansas/story/2016/jan/25/suit-
viewed-test-states-open-carry-law/414170/ [https://perma.cc/D7MV-K4CY]. 
121. See Lilley & Glisovic, supra note 87; Order Affirming Decision of Ark. State
Police, supra note 93, at 2. 
122. Steinbock, supra note 103, at 520.
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to seize the weapon and the person, as well as search the person 
and his or her immediate surroundings.123 
IV. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION
A. Arkansas Supreme Court
A judicial interpretation of this statute is needed.  As of the 
writing of this article, the Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to 
address the Open Carry Statute head-on, and the state continues 
to be torn in every direction in handling these situations.124  
Indeed, each county in the state is treating this statute differently 
and it is impossible, as a threshold matter, to understand exactly 
what to do with an offense.125  A potential solution to this 
problem lies with the Arkansas Supreme Court.  It is essential 
that the judicial system interpret the Open Carry Statute and 
determine if Arkansas really does allow for open carry.  By 
making an affirmative ruling on the newly revised statute, the 
Supreme Court could calm at least some of the tension 
reverberating throughout the state.126 
B. Arkansas General Assembly
The legislature, by changing this law and allowing for open 
carry, has inadvertently opened the door for law enforcement to 
use their discretion in both consensual and Terry encounters and 
to engage in investigations of persons openly carrying firearms 
with little—if any—legal restrictions.  All that is required of law 
enforcement officers is to develop reasonable suspicion that 
such individual has or is about to commit a crime.127  After the 
officers develop reasonable suspicion, they have the authority to 
conduct a seizure of the individual, and subsequently search that 
123. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.4.
124. Tom Henry, “Open Carry” Confusion, BLYTHEVILLE COURIER NEWS (June
23, 2015), http://www.blythevillecourier.com/story/2207419.html [https://perma.cc/LBK8-
FSV4].  
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 79, 628 S.W.2d 284, 288 (1982); see also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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person.128  This is especially problematic when the individual is 
in their vehicle, where reasonable suspicion is all that is needed 
to search the passenger compartment of an automobile when 
dealing with the safety of police officers on duty.129 
This problem presents a major concern with the new 
statute.  The legislature has opened up the doors for law 
enforcement to investigate, stop, and frisk individuals who are 
openly carrying a firearm, and any additional evidence that the 
officers obtain from these searches is admissible against the 
individual, including evidence of unrelated crimes.130  Because 
officers enjoy great discretion, especially when a dangerous 
weapon is present, it is a natural progression that the 
accumulation of these interactions will cause tension between 
communities and their law enforcement departments.  
Furthermore, this discretion, through the current framework of 
the Fourth Amendment, significantly erodes the fundamental 
constitutional protections afforded to all citizens of this state.  It 
is imperative that the Arkansas General Assembly provide 
clarifications on what exactly these revisions mean.  Does Ark. 
Code Ann. § 5-73-120 definitively make this state an open carry 
state?  Is this exactly what the 2013 revisions intended? May 
anyone openly carry a firearm?  These are the questions that the 
state desperately needs definitive answers to.  The citizens of 
this state deserve concrete answers from the Arkansas General 
Assembly. 
V. PROPOSAL FOR A REVISED STATUTE
Considering the current legal framework of the Fourth 
Amendment, especially the nature and extent of law 
enforcement’s expansive legal capability under Terry stop and 
frisks and consensual encounters, the Arkansas Open Carry 
128. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
129. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-46 (1972).
130. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (holding that there
are certain circumstances when a warrantless seizure by police of an item that comes 
within plain view during their lawful search of a private area may be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding that 
probable cause is required to invoke the “plain view” doctrine).  
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Statute erodes fundamental protections of law-abiding citizens, 
and therefore must be re-written or completely discarded.  The 
concerns of officer discretion raised in these citizen-police 
encounters inevitably lead to a deterioration of citizens’ rights, 
and without concrete clarification of statutory intent, the lack of 
guidance is costing law-abiding citizens of Arkansas their 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
Furthermore, because the current text of the Arkansas Open 
Carry Statute is ambiguous and has caused a significant amount 
of confusion, this article proposes that a revision to this statute 
would provide more clarification and would greatly reduce the 
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections perpetuated by an 
unclear and difficult statute.  There are many states that have 
functioning open carry statutes.131  However, there are many 
different state approaches to open carry such as prohibiting long 
guns,132 requiring permits to openly carry,133 or prohibiting 
handguns while allowing for the open carry of long guns.134  
Understanding that there is no one perfect way, there are many 
other states that allow for open carry through a more effective 
statutory scheme that does not perpetuate the erosion of 
individual Fourth Amendment protections. 
Arizona is famous for some of the most lenient approaches 
when it comes to gun laws.135  The statutory scheme in Arizona 
allows for any adult person who is not a “prohibited possessor” 
to openly carry a loaded firearm visible to others.136  Arizona’s 
131. See Joshua Gillin, There Are 45 States That Allow Open Carry for Firearms,
Former NRA President Says, POLITIFACT (Nov. 18, 2015, 5:26 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2015/nov/18/marion-hammer/there-are-45-
states-allow-open-carry-handguns-form/ [https://perma.cc/HWF7-JBJ3]; Open Carrying, 
LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/open-carrying-policy-
summary/ [https://perma.cc/U2RD-322K]. 
132. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26400 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.053
(West 2011). 
133. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 571.037 (2013); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 1289.6
(2012); V.T.C.A. § 46.02 (West 2016).  
134. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-20 (2014).
135. Matthew Hartvigsen, 10 States with the Most Lenient Gun Laws, DESERET 
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/top/1429/8/Arizona-10-
states-with-the-most-lenient-gun-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/KZ32-FFTA]. 
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3101(A)(7), 3102 (2016).
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open carry law is different from Arkansas’s current Open Carry 
Statute in a number of ways.  First and foremost, there is no 
requirement—or even mention—of intent to use a weapon 
unlawfully in Arizona’s Misconduct Involving Weapons 
statute.137  This contrasts starkly against Arkansas’s Open Carry 
Statute because it de-incentivizes law enforcement investigation, 
while the intent requirement of Arkansas’s Open Carry Statute 
actually encourages, if not requires, officer investigation.  
Without any mental state requirement, Arizona is effectively 
deterring police investigation of these presumably law-abiding 
citizens—placing them on the same playing field as any person 
not carrying a firearm—thereby reducing the need for officer 
discretion and, inevitably, the erosion of Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
Another contrast with Arizona’s Misconduct Involving 
Weapons statute—one that is readily apparent—is the clarity, 
consistency, and relative ease in understanding the statute, 
which Arkansas’s current statute lacks.  With little ambiguity, 
Arizona’s clear approval of open carry allows for law 
enforcement departments across the state to develop consistent 
policies when dealing with police-citizen encounters involving 
individuals who are openly carrying firearms.138  By following 
Arizona’s statutory construction of their open carry laws, 
Arkansas will make huge strides towards resolving the 
controversy, concern, and misunderstandings that have plagued 
open carry in this state since Act 746’s textual revisions. 
Therefore, if the Arkansas legislature intends for this state 
to be an open carry state, they should, for example, adopt a 
statutory construction of the Carrying a Weapon Statute similar 
to that of Arizona’s139 to read: 
137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3102 (West 2016).
138. See Robert Farago, Open Carry Interaction with the Police: A Law
Enforcement Perspective, THETRUTHABOUTGUNS.COM (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2014/03/robert-farago/open-carry-interaction-with-the-
police-a-law-enforcement-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/4T25-4XFZ].  
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3102.
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(a) A person commits the offense of carrying a
weapon by knowingly possessing a handgun, knife, or
club on or about his person:
(1) in furtherance of a serious offense or during the
commission of any felony;
(2) if such person is prohibited from possessing such
weapon; or
(3) if entering any establishment where possession of
such weapon is unauthorized, unless otherwise
specifically authorized by law.
With this statutory scheme, the Arkansas Legislature will 
be able to determine who is allowed to openly carry a firearm 
and where such possession is legal.  By replacing the current 
ambiguous language of the Arkansas statute in this manner, the 
state will definitively and unambiguously become an open carry 
state by removing any penalty for openly carrying a firearm 
unless one of these characterizations apply.  Of course, the 
Legislature can and should delineate which persons are 
prohibited from possessing such firearms and should develop 
laws that specifically outline the requirements for possession of 
firearms in restricted areas. 
VI. CONCLUSION
It is essential that Arkansas citizens are educated about the 
law and understand how law enforcement agencies will be 
handling these situations going forward.  Those who do carry 
openly should be aware that officers have an expansive 
capability to investigate individuals who are carrying firearms.  
By openly carrying a firearm in Arkansas, you are, in effect, 
providing law enforcement officials with another substantial 
factor to contribute to the development of reasonable suspicion 
that you are engaged in criminal activity, a factor that is 
determinatively against you.  The current form of the Arkansas 
Open Carry Statute must be revised.  By considering the 
expansive discretion of police officers in both Terry stop and 
frisk scenarios as well as consensual encounters, it is clear that 
the present construction of the statute will continue to erode 
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Fourth Amendment protections of law-abiding citizens who are 
openly carrying firearms in public.  It is up to the courts and the 
legislature to provide clarity and to revise the statute accordingly 
to prevent the continuation of this injustice against liberty. 
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